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WILLLIS'S AMERICAN COUNTERPARTS:
THE LEGAL REALISTS' DEFENCE OF ADMINISTRATIONt
I Introduction
To an American lawyer, or at least any lawyer familiar with the debates
over administrative law and government in the critical years from 1920
through 1940, the voice of John Willis is instantly recognizable. He is
clearly one of the gang - the legal realists who were concerned to expand
the authority of administrative agencies to govern new areas of economic
life; to promote their virtues as policy makers and adjudicators over those
of their chief rivals, the courts; to defend them against charges of
arbitrariness and absolutism; and to limit the scope ofjudicial review of
their decisions. The voice is familiar in style as well as in substance - the
slashing sharp-pointed satirical barbs aimed to puncture the inflated
claims ofjudicial 'formalism' and the blunt no-nonsense plain style used
to highlight the virtues of civil servants' 'functionalism.' Close your eyes
and you could be listening to Thurman Arnold, Reed Powell, orJerome
Frank. Willis is just as witty and quite a bit more succinct.
So Willis and the American realists are evidently steeped in a common
set of argumentative modes and rhetorics as well as common aims. Part of
my purpose here is to identify those commonalities; but another part is to
point to significant points of difference as well, both among the principal
American realists and between them and Willis. I find that the exercise of
reading through a sizeable chunk of the realist literature on administra-
tion has stirred in me a modest rehabilitative urge. The realists did more
than make sport ofjudges, courts, and legal reasoning and naively praise
the expertise of bureaucrats, though, to be sure, they did plenty of both.
Although the realists were by no means above crude polemics, their
arguments at their best are both interesting and complex. My focus here
will be on a group of lawyers who were the principal intellectual defend-
ers of the administrative state:John Dickinson, Thurman Arnold,Jerome
Frank, andJames Landis. These men taught at law schools (Dickinson at
Pennsylvania, Arnold and Frank at Yale, Landis at Harvard) but wrote for
wide public audiences as well as for academic law reviews. They all had at
some point held important administrative posts in the New Deal: Frank as
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general counsel for the Agricultural Adjustment Authority, Landis and
Frank as SEC Commissioners, Arnold as assistant attorney-general for anti-
trust, Dickinson as a draftsman (in the Commerce Department) of the
National Industrial Recovery Act and defender (in the Justice Depart-
ment) of other New Deal legislation in litigation challenging its constitu-
tionality. Finally, I want to look at some of the criticisms that have been
made of Willis and the American realists - both in their own time and in
our own - and consider if they are well deserved.
In the early phases of the great debate over administrative discretion,
the American realists were mostly playing defence, responding to a series
of wholesale intemperate assaults on administrative arbitrariness and
absolutism. Some of these came in the form of decisions and dicta of the
us Supreme Court itself in reviewing decisions of administrative agencies
and the constitutionality of the legislation creating them.1 To judge by a
casual inspection of the law review, speech, and pamphlet literature,
most of the attackers were conservative lawyers who represented business
clients, such as those who formed the notorious Lawyers' Committee of
the Liberty League as a public-interest group to denounce and litigate
the constitutionality of New Deal legislation. (Such lawyers, incidentally,
were evidently motivated as much or more by ideological passion as by
clients' interests. Not surprisingly, lawyers whose actual work for clients
most frequently brought them into contact with administrative agencies
tended to be much more moderate and circumspect in their criticisms of
those agencies and of administrative procedure generally.) The attacks
borrowed liberally from English critics such as Lord Hewart: in fact, one
of the best-known lawyers of the time, the former solicitor generalJames
Beck, wrote Our Wonderland of Bureaucracy (1932) in open imitation of
Hewart's The New Despotism (1929).2 The attacks gained their most
powerful domestic intellectual support from Roscoe Pound, the former
Harvard dean. Pound had earned a reputation as a critic of the delays
and inefficiencies ofjudicial procedure and of classical jurisprudence as
1 See, e.g.,Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936) at 23-4, 28 (per SutherlandJ.): 'The action of
the Commission [in issuing a "stop order" denying a registrant of securities permission
to withdraw its registration statement after the SEC had found it materially misleading]
finds no support in right principle or law. It is wholly unreasonable and arbitrary. It
violates the cardinal precept upon which the constitutional safeguards of personal
liberty ultimately rest - that this shall be a government of laws - because to the precise
extent the mere will of an official or an official body is permitted to take the place of
allowable official discretion or to supplant the standing law as a rule of human conduct,
the government ceases to be one of laws and becomes an autocracy.... [The SEC's
action could be classed] among those intolerable abuses of the Star Chamber, which
brought that institution to an end at the hands of the Long Parliament in 1640.'
2 James M. Beck, Our Wonderland of Bureaucracy: A Study of the Growth of Bureaucracy in the
Federal Government, and Its Destructive Effect upon the Constitution (New York: Macmillan,
1932); Lord Hewart, The New Despotism (London: Ernest Benn, 1929).
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'mechanical' and based on outworn dogmas of 'natural law' designed for
a 'frontier society.' By the 1930s this eminent legal reformer had become
a fierce critic of the New Deal and administrative procedure. Pound
wrote the report of the Special Committee on Administrative Procedure
of the American Bar Association in 19383 and several follow-up books and
articles in 1942 and 1944. 4 His work laid the foundation for legislation,
the Walter-Logan Bill of 1939,' which sought to impose on all federal
agencies a uniform formal quasi-judicial procedure for decision making.
The bill would have required all agency decisions to be based on 'substan-
tial evidence' gathered in trial-type hearings and subject to intensive
judicial review in the federal courts. Roosevelt vetoed the Walter-Logan
Bill in 1940.6
Much of the debate on both sides was conducted in exceedingly
abstract and general terms. Each side constructed and critiqued a
caricature of the other and opposed to the other's vices a romantic
conception of its own side's virtues. Critics of administration portrayed it
as essentially lawless. Agencies made decisions without announcing in
advance what issues were at stake or what the governing rules would be;
they found facts without affording any or adequate opportunities for
affected interests to challenge the findings; they issued decisions without
reasons or explanations; and they sought to insulate these decisions from
judicial review. They violated basic principles of separation of powers by
using non-judicial process to adjudicate and by combining the functions
of prosecutor, investigator, judge, and jury in a single official. The
opposite and antidote to administrative arbitrariness and despotism was
the rule of law, which could be produced only by ordinary judges in
ordinary courts, deciding issues of fact by adversary trials and of law by
common law and constitutional principles protecting individual rights to
property and liberty.
Defenders responded in kind. At its most abstract, their critique of the
judicial conception of the 'rule of law' simply extended the realist cri-
tique of 'formalism' and 'conceptualism,' of the idea of law as a 'science
3 Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 Ann. Rep, Am. Bar Ass'n.
331 (1938).
4 See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Administrative Law: Its Growth, Procedure and Significance
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1942); Roscoe Pound, 'Administrative Law
and the Couts, 24 Boston U.L. Rev. 201 (1944).
5 S. 915, H.R 6324, 76th Cong. (1939).
6 Roosevelt appointed his own committee, headed by Dean Acheson, to study
administrative procedure. That committee's report was the basis for the Administrative
Procedure Act of 1946, which remains, though so layered over by statutory exceptions
and judicial glosses as to be almost unrecognizable, the general code of us
administrative procedure: c. 324. 60 Stat. 327 (1946) (now 5 U.S.C. § 551ff).
HeinOnline -- 55 U. Toronto L.J. 407 2005
408 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL
of great symmetrical principles,' 7 a gapless system from which all sub-
rules and particular applications might be derived by an autonomous
process of logical deduction. Actual systems of substantive law were
riddled with gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities. Juristic conceptions,
supposedly transcendent and apolitical, were either outworn dogmas of
earlier times (Willis's '18th century constitution,'8 Dickinson's 'Locke
petrified into an immortality of infallibility,' 9 Holmes's 'Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics"), or simply incorporated political-economic
biases reflexively favourable to business interests or comfortable classes.
Generalist judges were ignorant of social and economic facts informing
administrative policies. The civil trial procedures fetishized by attackers
of bureaucracy were mocked as 'trial by combat' - inefficient, protracted,
favouring wealthier litigants, able to consider only issues raised by the
parties, ludicrously trusting that the clash of opposing distortions will
produce truth." The antidote to (empty) formalism and (outdated and
biased) conceptualism is 'functionalism,' a pragmatic cast of mind bent
upon solving concrete problems and armed with expert non-legal
knowledge of specialized facts and experience.
At this level the debate, consisting as it did mostly of name-calling, was
relatively unilluminating. It got more interesting as the parties got more
specific.
II Realist institutional description as argument
Some defenders simply tried to refute the caricatures by detailing how
actual agency practice incorporated the due process safeguards that the
critics said were missing. Frank asserted that in every SEC proceeding, the
agency held public hearings, announced explicit standards for its
decisions, made a record, and explained its decisions. It set elaborate
procedural safeguards when it was both prosecuting and deciding. It also
consulted with the industry about every rule. 2 Bureaucracies, he points
out in If Men Were Angels, prefer adopting rules to standardless discretion;
it is safer. Landis agreed: the prime failing of administrators was using
legalism to avoid responsibility for exercising discretion, not exercising
7 Thurman W. Arnold, The Symbols of Government (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1935) at 46 [Symbols].
8 John Willis, 'The McRuer Report: Lawyers' Values and Civil Servants' Values' (1968) 18
U.T.L.J. 351 ['Lawyers' Values'].
9 John Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law in the United States
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927) at 339-40 n. 7 [Administrative Justice].
10 Lochnerv. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) at 75 (perHolmesJ. dissenting).
11 See, e.g., Arnold, Symbols, supra note 7 at 172-98.
12 Jerome Frank, If Men Were Angels: Some Aspects of Government in a Democracy (New York:
Harper, 1942) at c. 5 [If Men Were Angels].
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discretion arbitrarily. 3 Frank added that agencies have discretion
because industries want it. Business groups complain about discretion,
but when the time comes to amend statutes, they ask for more; they
prefer the speed and informality of relatively informal processes and of
dispositions tailored to their particular needs rather than rigid rules.
'Rigid and inflexible prohibitions might well paralyze an industry.' 14 The
bureaucratic clumsiness of which regulated interests complain often
comes from the effort to make agencies more like courts. 5
Is the judicial process a superior upholder of the rule of law? Only, the
realists argued, if one idealizes the process and ignores its actual func-
tioning. In fact-finding, juries make decisions that are inscrutable,
unexplained, and accepted as final and unreviewable. Why should such
decisions be considered intrinsically superior to fact-finding by experts?
Anyway, even jury trial was more process than most people got from the
courts. Many of the decisions nominally issuing from courts were actually
made by administrators exercising a practically unreviewable discretion.
The police had discretion to arrest, bring charges, and extract confes-
sions from suspects by the third degree. Prosecutors, combining prosecu-
torial and judicial powers, decided almost all criminal cases through plea
bargains. Courts overlooked violations of formal rights and ratified
almost all these decisions against the most vulnerable members of society
without any real review or oversight.' 6 As the field of government action
broadened, the 'earlier method of administration through the District
Attorney" 7 had been transferred to administrative agencies, usually
subject to much stricter constraints. Contrast to prosecutors, Frank points
out, the SEC, which has only limited remedies, which it can only enforce
after notice and hearing, to businesses well able to defend themselves.'"
Arnold generalizes the point: all decision processes, including those of
courts, have both formal and informal elements. The informal are used
when the institution needs to do quick, practical, flexible decision
making on the side. Courts preserve their ideal image as repositories of
fundamental legal principle by recategorizing practical problem-solving
functions as issues of 'procedure' or spheres of 'fact' to which an entirely
different logic applies, so that decisions may be made byjuries, or special
masters, or by reference to criteria apart from substantive law doctrines. 9
13 James M. Landis, TheAdministrativeProcess (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1938)
at 75.
14 Frank, If Men Were Angels, supra note 12 at 148, 150.
15 Arnold, Symbols, supra note 7 at 215.
16 Frank, If Men Were Angels, supra note 12 at App. VI.
17 Dickinson, 'Administrative Management, Administrative Regulation and the Judicial
Process' (1941) 89 U.Pa.L.J. 1052 at 1055.
18 Frank, If Men Were Angels, supra note 12 at App. VI.
19 Thurman W. Arnold, 'The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal Process'
(1932) 45 Harv.L.Rev. 617 at 642-6.
HeinOnline -- 55 U. Toronto L.J. 409 2005
410 UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAWJOURNAL
Finally, the realists ridiculed the notion thatjudges are more impartial




Advocates for a broad scope ofjudicial authority to review acts of admin-
istrative agencies often bolstered their case through arguments from
Whig history: that Coke in Bonham's Case had declared the principle that
acts of irresponsible commissions and even of Parliament must be subject
to review, and if necessary adjudged void, for violations of fundamental
law in the common law courts; and that this principle had been ratified
by the American Revolution and thereafter encoded in American con-
stitutional practice. Most realists did not bother much with these argu-
ments, being content with modernist assertions that times had changed
considerably since then and we ought not to be governed by an
eighteenth-century, much less a seventeenth-century, constitution. Dick-
inson accepted the orthodox history but questioned the relevance of
Coke's view of judicial supremacy - part of a search for 'an effective
practical check on a dangerous and otherwise irresponsible sovereign
not ruling by popular right' - to modern democratic government.
21
Frank, as usual, took a more iconoclastic approach. He debunked the
'legendary' Coke, pointing out that Coke never objected to the Privy
Council or Star Chamber;22 he reproved Coke for hindering the develop-
ment of flexible equityjurisprudence;23 he alleged that the procedures of
High Commission, except where Puritans were concerned, were gener-
ally more efficient and more fair to the accused than those of common
law;24 he debunked the claim that the American founders' understanding
supported judicial supremacy, arguing that Hamilton and Madison
distrusted popular government but wanted energy in the executive;25 he
believed that the current vogue for courts as a check on government was
a response to the expansion of democracy in the late nineteenth
century.26
Iv Critique ofjudicial review in practice
To judge by volume of writing, the realists spent more time describing
and criticizing how courts had actually reviewed agency actions than they
20 See, e.g., Frank, If Men Were Angels, supra note 12 at 187.
21 Dickinson, Administrative Justice, supra note 9 at 93.
22 Frank, If Men Were Angels, supra note 12 at 227
23 Ibid. at 182.
24 Ibid. at 247.
25 Ibid. at 230.
26 Ibid. at 238.
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spent on any other topic of administrative law. This emphasis is perhaps
more than a little ironic, since the realists' academic agenda was to try to
redirect legal studies away from the study of courts. But to make their
case that judicial review of administration needed to be limited, it was
crucial to show how it had actually been carried out. Dickinson's classic
Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law in the United States (1927),
the first major analytic book on administrative adjudication, is largely
devoted to examination of Supreme Court cases reviewing agency action.
Dickinson notes that statutory and case law on judicial review of action
was usually structured around the distinction between law and fact.
Statutes made some agency determinations of fact 'conclusive' or
presumptively so. Courts often said that their role was only to inquire into
whether the agency had acted within its jurisdiction and, if so, had acted
'arbitrarily.' 'What is substantially the same rule is elsewhere stated in the
form that courts will review for error of law, but not findings of fact, at
least where, on the evidence, the findings are within the bounds of rea-
son.' 27 Dickinson gives the fact/law distinction the usual realist acid bath.
Take U.S. v.Ju Toy,28 where a statute authorized the immigration agency
to exclude aliens of Chinese nationality.Ju Toy said he had been born in
the United States; the agency 'found' he had been born in China. The
Supreme Court said the agency's official determination was conclusive.
Dickinson points out that if a court refuses to give any review to agency
findings of 'fact,' it is allowing the agency to determine its own jurisdic-
tion.
[Questions of law and fact] are not two mutually exclusive kinds of question,
based upon a difference of subject-matter. Matters of law grow downward into
roots of fact, and matters of fact reach upward, without a break, into matters of
law. The knife of policy alone effects an artificial cleavage at the point where the
court chooses to draw the line between public interest and private right. It would
seem that when the courts are unwilling to review, [they call the question one of
fact]; and when otherwise disposed, they say that it is a question of 'law.'29
Yet the courts made even more serious mistakes when, moving in the
opposite direction from cases like Ju Toy, they converted virtually every
question of fact into a question ofjurisdiction or law and insisted upon de
novo review or something close to it. Here Dickinson joined a swelling
chorus of Progressive critics of Supreme Court review of rate-making by
public utility commissions. To simplify this now tedious but once burning
issue: 30 the Supreme Court, since the 1880s, had made itself into a high
27 Dickinson, Administrative Justice, supra note 9 at 50.
28 198 U.S. 253, cited ibid. at 51.
29 Dickinson, Administrative Justice, supra note 9at 55.
30 The best account I know of this controversy and its centrality to Progressive legal-
economic thought is in Barbara Fried, The Progressive Assault on Laissez-Faire: Robert Hale
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court of errors and appeals from decisions of state regulatory commis-
sions. The Court had held that investors' expectations of a reasonable
rate of return were 'property' protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
against expropriation by state governments, so that if a commission fixed
rates that were unreasonably low because not based on 'fair value,' it was
violating the federal Constitution. This doctrine put the federal courts in
the unhappy position of having to review rate-making records to police
against confiscatory rates. In the famous Ben Avon case of 1919,31 the
Supreme Court said that reviewing courts could not simply accept
commission findings based on substantial evidence but must reach a
'determination upon [their] own independent judgment as to both law
and facts.'
3 2
The obvious problem with allowing objections to jurisdiction or
constitutionality to require an independent judicial hearing on all
subsidiary facts that might have a bearing on those issues is that it would
seem to vitiate the purpose of setting up the agency in the first place.
According to Dickinson,
It destroys the effectiveness of administrative regulation by reducing the
administrative body to a practical nullity with a barren power of initial recom-
mendation; and it yields no gain in security for the rights of property. Indeed
there is an actual loss in security, because greater confusion and not greater
certainty is bound to be the outcome of the practice. 3
Similarly, Landis writes,
In the field of rate-making the effect of the [Ben Avon] case has been to prolong
interminably the process of administrative rate-making. A delay of ten or fifteen
years, an expenditure of millions of dollars, constant interruption of administra-
tive proceedings by appeals to the courts, have brought the regulator process
into contempt. The practice of appealing to the Court on every issue of fact
and the First Law and Economics Movement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).
at 160-204.
31 Ohio Water Valley Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1919) [Ben Avon].
32 Ibid. at 289. The Ben Avon doctrine of the need for independent review of facts was
reaffirmed in St.Joseph Stock Yards v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936) (upholding order
of Secretary of Agriculture fixing maximum rates charged by a stockyard company, but
stating that reviewing court had to find of its own accord that court would reach the
same conclusion about the value of the property); and Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22
(1932) (holding that federal Longshoreman's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,
setting up an administrative workers' compensation program for maritime workers, was
a constitutional exercise of federal power only if applied to workers falling within the
admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, hence whether employee was a maritime
worker and about his employer's business at the time of his injury were jurisdictional'
facts requiring independentjudicial determination).
33 Dickinson, Administrative Justice, supra note 9 at 201.
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relating to valuation has transformed what should be a businesslike proceeding
into a bitter, wrangling lawyers' battle. 4
Landis adds, quoting Brandeis J. speaking of the effects of the doctrine
on workers' compensation claims, that the 'advantage of prolonged
litigation lies with the party able to bear heavy expenses.'3 5 Lord Hewart
argued in The New Despotism that judicial review would lead to less, not
more, litigation because agencies would render only decisions they could
defend before a court.3 6 The critics of review of fact asserted that experi-
ence had proved otherwise.
But the problem was broader: it was that courts sitting as judges of
facts so often judged them ineptly or inappropriately. Again, the public
utilities cases presented ample targets for ridicule. By insisting on making
an independent assessment of 'fair value,' the courts had waded into the
economics of valuation, which, in case after case, it became evident that
they grasped only dimly. Their preferred standard seemed to be that 'fair
value' meant 'exchange value,' but, as countless writers point out, the test
is circular: '[E] xchange value is a logically impossible basis for rate-fixing
because it depends on prospective income, and so on the rates to be
fixed. '3
Also, of course, since courts were often hostile to the purposes of
administrative regulation, to allow a broad scope of review of fact was an
invitation to the practical nullification of regulatory statutes. 8
The main vice of courts as reviewers of law - besides political bias - was
the parochialism of lawyers' vision. They tended to assimilate new social
problems that arose to the categories and doctrines they were used to
and to be suspicious of unfamiliar remedies. Confronted with labour
strikes, judicial minds classified them as 'conspiracies.' Reviewing the
SEC's 'stop-order' procedure, the Supreme Court decided that the agency
could not be allowed to prohibit issuers from withdrawing registrations
found to be based on fraudulent or misleading statements because equity
courts traditionally lacked that power. 'Legal interference with social
forces,' Dickinson declares, in language any realist might have used, 'is
hurtful wherever the law pays no regard to the nature and meaning of
those forces, but crudely seeks to apply to them rules derived by a
mechanical logic from other rules or cases showing formal resemblances
that conceal substantial differences.'
39
34 Landis, The Administrative Process, supra note 13 at 133.
35 Ibid. at 134, quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 at 94.
36 Hewart, New Despotism, supra note 2 at 161-3.
37 Dickinson, Administrative Justice, supra note 9 at 209.
38 See, e.g., among innumerable other places, James M. Landis, 'Crucial Issues in
Administrative Law - The Walter-Logan Bill' (1940) 53 Harv.L.Rev. 1077 at 1092.
39 Dickinson, Administrative Justice, supra note 9 at 218.
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Interestingly, Dickinson did not conclude that the solution was to do
away with judicial review. He believed that judges had a potentially
valuable function in their role as developers of general principles,
concepts, and rules to guide the administrative process. The technical
expertise of agencies is narrow; the 'limited and specialized nature of
their work, in a measure operate to unfit them for the task of developing
general rules of law.' A utility commission looks to solve one case; legal
rules have to be founded on 'broader considerations.'40 Formal legal
concepts and categories are useful in that they keep lawyers' eyes on the
broad picture, notjust the equities of particular cases, and leave room for
balancing various interests and equities over a wide run of cases.41
Unfortunately, judicial review in actual practice was often useless,
because the courts simply second-guessed administrative decisions case
by case, without articulating decisional standards other than vague
contentless ones, and gave agencies no guidance in the form of rules or
operational standards. For proper performance of the judicial function,
a whole new cadre of judges would have to be trained. (More on this
below.)
Most of Dickinson's fellow public law realists, however, were more
distrustful of courts' capacity, ideology, and equipment.
V Corporate managers have more unaccountable discretion than agencies
Realists thought the more important comparison was not between
agencies and courts but between agencies and the private (usually cor-
porate) parties whose decisions agencies sought to regulate or influence.
Although personified as individuals, corporations are really organized in
bureaucratic hierarchies just as government agencies are; they regulate,
tax, and coerce those subject to their power; and although their subjects
in theory consent to such exactions, as a practical matter they are often
less able to influence their corporate rulers or hold them accountable
than they are to respond to many acts of democratic governments.
'l[P] enalties that private management can impose possess a coercive force
and effect that government even with its threat of incarceration cannot
equal.' 42 Thus Arnold, referring to the decision of the A&P Grocery
Company to close three stores in Cleveland, throwing 2 200 people out of
work:
In that control over our affairs by a governing force usually referred to as
business, we permit great employers almost absolute power over the livelihood of
40 Ibid. at 234
41 Ibid. at 142-51.
42 Landis, The Administrative Process, supra note 13 at 11.
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perhaps the greatest percentage of our population, and allow them to use this
power without even giving reasons for their action. We do this through a slogan
which clothes our great employers with a mystical sanction not differing in effect
from the divine right of kings.
43
Frank more prosaically points to the defects in the theory that corpora-
tions need no regulation because they are restrained by competition and
by duties to their shareholders. Corporate managers are not answerable
to diffuse shareholders; large firms operate in markets of 'monopolistic
competition' and take no account of externalities such as effects on
employment." The modern corporation, as Walton Hamilton, a Yale and
New Deal colleague of Arnold's put it, is a private government:
As its anatomy has become rigid, the authority of the corporation has become
enlarged. In the good old days, the business unit was a private affair. For the
concern was small, there were many to an industry, its contracts were made at
arms [length], it was one of two parties of equal power in shaping the terms of
the bargain. But, as the business unit has become the corporate estate, it has
gone far to usurp the office of the market. Where goods are trademarked, put up
in standard packages, passed along routine channels, made notorious by
advertising, detail cannot be left to the impersonal operation of economic
forces. A flexible price hardly accords with the rigidities of intricate organiza-
tions. Decisions in respect to cost, design, promotion, volume of product must
be made months before goods are ready to be sold [The] market, when its
chance comes, can only confirm or rebut managerial judgment. Where a
concern, singly or in concert with its fellows, enjoys a sheltered market, it decrees
price, and between itself and its customers becomes both party and judge. Thus
one of the two parties to the bargain has been catapulted into a public office.4 5
Government regulation through administrative agencies, by limiting
and imposing rules upon private discretion to coerce, thus enlarges
rather than contracting the sphere of liberty. New rights such as the
'ight of reasonable security in bank deposits,' the ight to worker's
compensation, and the ights of labour under the Wagner Act have
'swelled the charter of liberties.'4 6 The point of legislation requiring the
SEC to submit reports on reorganization plans to courts whose approval is
sought for those plans is to protect parties, such as small creditors and
43 Arnold, Symbols, supra note 7 at 217.
44 Frank, If Men Were Angels, supra note 12 at 167ff.
45 Walton H. Hamilton, Book Review of Bureaucracy and Trusteeship in Large Corporations by
Marshall E. Dimock & Harold K. Hyde (1942) 55 Harv.L.Rev. 551 at 553.
46 James M. Landis, 'Law and the New Liberties' (1939) 4 Mo.L.Rev. 105. Compare Willis
on the assumption (of legal critics ofadministration) that danger to liberty comes from
the government, 'not the predatory real estate developers, suppliers of goods and
services, salesmen of mining shares etc.' Willis, 'Lawyers' Values,' supra note 8 at 353.
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stockholders, who cannot adequately protect their interests through
contract.
47
VI Arnold's symbolic theory
Thurman Arnold made a distinct contribution to the debate over the
relative virtues of agencies and courts. Like other realists, he debunked
the caricatured picture of agencies and the idealized picture of courts in
conservative rhetoric:
The distinction between bureaus and courts is important. Courts are bound by
precedent, and bureaus are bound by red tape. Of course courts are forced to
follow precedent even when it leads to absurd results because of their solemn
obligation [s]. But bureaus in allowing themselves to be bound by red tape do so
out of pure malice and disregard for the fundamentals of freedom. The distinc-
tion between a bureau which is a very bad sort of thing and a commission with
quasijudicial powers is that the commission is more like a court than it is like a
bureau. Therefore if we are very watchful of these commissions and see [that
their work] occurs only on lower levels, and in comparatively minor matters such
as the valuation of railroads, the fixing of rates, workmen's compensation,
banking, taxation, trade regulation, zoning, immigration, irrigation of arid lands,
drainage, insurance, and similar things which do not involve the great principles
of freedom - as for example a suit for libel and slander, replevin or criminal
conversation - we may escape this new form of despotism.4"
But Arnold did not find these symbols simply ridiculous: they serve a
function - the same kind of function as religious ritual. Societies operate
on 'spiritual' as well as 'temporal' planes. The temporal is the domain of
instrumental function and reason, the use of practical means of experi-
ment to practical ends. The spiritual is the world of (popular, irrational)
folklore, meaning, and ideals, the symbols that help people to believe
that the world is as they think it ought to be. The dogmas that courts
simply apply legal authority, the authority of the constitution, or com-
mon law and therefore act as guardians of tradition and principle; that
they follow directions of legislatures and are therefore not responsible
for the silly things they do; and that they can oversee and correct the
decisions of administrative agencies are all necessary to uphold the idea
of the rule of law, not men, a beautiful dream of transcendent principles
47 See Jerome Frank, 'Epithetical Jurisprudence and the Work of the Securities and
Exchange Commission in the Administration of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act'
(1940) 18 N.Y.U.L.Q. 317.
48 Thurman W. Arnold, 'The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal Process'
(1932) 45 Harv.L.Rev 617 at 624-5,626 (substantially repeated in Arnold, Symbols, supra
note 7).
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above politics and factional interest. Law professors act as the 'high
priests' of these dogmas and rituals, constantly working to harmonize the
output of courts into systems of grand principle.49
When the symbol of 'government by law' is attacked, the gaunt specter of
bureaucracy arises to haunt us. The arbitrary treatment which is accorded us in
our daily lives threatens to be no longer tempered by the thought that some-
where above in some cool calm judicial chamber is stored a great mass of
counterprinciples which would rise to our aid if we only had time and money to
get at them. IJudicial institutions] represent justice in a world where there is
little of fairness to the common man.5 °
His realist contemporaries, including Willis, used Arnold's language in
referring to exaltation of the judicial process and idealization of the
courts as 'ritual,' 'theology,' or 'superstition.' (Willis greatly admired
Arnold and wrote very favourable reviews of his Symbols of Government and
Folklore of Capitalism.1) But for the most part they seem to have regarded
the 'spiritual' plane as simply superfluous mystification, dispensable once
people had been helped to see through it and outgrow it. Arnold consid-
ered it a permanent aspect of human nature and social life; he saw the
social engineer's job as one of learning how to manipulate symbols and
rituals as well as finding functional solutions.
VII Agencies have distinct advantages in knowledge, functions, and procedures
Most of what has been reported so far is the realists' negative case for
administrative authority and autonomy: that the judicial process and
private governments were just as arbitrary if not more so; that aggressive
judicial review, advanced by the reformers as a cure for the ills of admin-
istration, was only likely, to judge by the record, to make things worse.
But of course they also made a positive case.
The minimum positive case was that the administrative process at its
best is just as fair as or more so than the judicial process and that it is also
more reliable and more efficient. As previously noted, Frank pointed out
that his own agency, the SEC, had in every proceeding explicit standards,
public hearings, a record, and published decisions with reasons. The
agency consulted with the industry beforehand about every rule. Its
procedural rules provided safeguards in the form of internal separation
49 Thurman W. Arnold, 'Institute Priests and Yale Observers: A Reply to Dean Goodrich'
(1936) 84 U.Pa.L.Rev 811.
50 Arnold, Symbols, supra note 7 at 224-5.
51 John Willis, Book Review of The Symbols of Government by Thurman W. Arnold (1936)
Can.Bar Rev. 278;John Willis, Book Review of The Folklaore of Capitalism by Thurman W.
Arnold (1938) 16 Can.Bar Rev. 417.
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of functions when the agency was both investigating and prosecuting. On
the whole, the agency offered more predictability to affected parties than
did courts and common-law procedures. The agency made rules as well as
deciding case by case, though it had the advantage over courts of greater
flexibility to change the rules if experience suggested that was necessary.
It also gave advance interpretive or advisory opinions to industries that
requested them.52
More generally, the realists argued that administrative fact-finding is
superior because better informed. Agencies conduct their own proactive
investigations with expert staff rather than waiting for parties to bring
facts to them. They hear evidence from a wide variety of interests, notjust
the regulated industries. Agency heads and staff are more expert than
generalist courts and far more so than lay juries; their investigations of
fields of industrial conditions and experience of like cases have soaked
them in contextual knowledge. A specialist is more likely to get at the
truth of a fact and the meaning of a fact and its implications for policy
than a generalistjudge who 'cannot maintain a long-time uninterrupted
interest in a relatively narrow and carefully defined area of economic and
social activity.'5 3 Best of all, agency staff - certainly as compared to
litigation adversaries - are capable of achieving relatively independent
and disinterested knowledge and perspective - something more closely
akin to science than to advocacy. Landis liked to tell the story of how the
SEC went about deciding whether corporations should be compelled to
disclose salaries of management and cost of goods sold. Companies
complained that disclosure would encourage competitors and large
customers to force deep cuts in prices. The SEC sent off a team of lawyers,
financial analysts, and accountants. The team found that the information
was rarely used in setting prices and that most players in the industry
52 Thurman Arnold, of all people, was eventually to dissent from the general realist view
that agencies are more efficient. When he became head of the Antitrust Division and
constrained to use the courts as his enforcement instrument, he began to argue that it
is precisely the superior symbolic appeal of courts in the political culture that makes
them more efficient organs for the carrying out of general state policies, because they
can legitimately operate with fewer encumbrances:
Administrative tribunals are never able to apply principles which we regard as
fundamental in such a way as to escape constant and harassingjudicial reviews. In such
situations the administrative process does not save time; it wastes it.... A real
investigation without artificial limitations can be conducted in secret before a grand
jury. This is a faster and far more efficient process than is possible before any
commission. No one argues that the defendants are being denied due process, because
the judicial system is the symbol of due process itself.
Thurman W. Arnold, The Bottlenecks of Business (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1940)
at 103.
53 Landis, The Administrative Process, supra note 13 at 30.
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knew it anyway.54 This technique 'could not possibly have characterized
the judicial process,' which would have produced only party-supplied
information 'subjected merely to the cross-fire of nonspecialized coun-
sel.'
55
Administrators are also better positioned than courts, the realists
argued, to represent the views and interests of constituencies usually
frozen out of the judicial process because they are too weak and unorga-
nized.55
The main defence of administrators was not, however, that at least in
their special fields they do what courts do but do it better: it was that
their functions are very different from those of courts. Dickinson, writing
in 1927, well before the coming of the New Deal, states those differences
modestly. Agencies often adjudicate matters of privilege, government-
created rights and benefits, rather than matters of common right. When
dealing with common rights, agencies have a different remedial ap-
proach: they regulate to prevent future harm, not just to redress or
sanction after it has occurred; they look out for the interests of the
general public, not just litigants in a particular action; and their instru-
ment is flexible rules based on discretion. 7
By the time we get to Landis's full-throated paean to administration in
1938, the account of its functions has considerably expanded. The
central tasks of administration are not to be compared with adjudication
(either of matters reassigned to agencies from the ordinary courts or of
claims to government privileges), nor even to legislation, but to executive
statesmanship and corporate governance. The function of administration
is to formulate 'broad and imaginative' national policy, to become co-
partners in management of dysfunctional industries. In this century,
'banking, insurance, utilities, shipping, communications - industries with
sicknesses stemming from misdirection as to objective or from failure
adequately to meet public needs - all came under the fostering guardian-
ship of the state. The mode of the exercise of that guardianship was the
administrative process.1 8 To the newly created SEC, for example,
It soon became apparent that regulation in this field implied the governance of
an industry consisting of investment banker, broker, and dealer. [T]he mere
proscription of abuses was insufficient to effect the realization of the broad
54 Ibid. at 42-4.
55 Ibid. at 45.
56 Ibid. at 37. Landis gives the examples of complaints of unfair labour practices; of small
creditors or stockholders, given the short end of the stick in corporate reorganizations,
who consent to plans because they have no resources to investigate their fairness or
contest them in litigation.
57 Dickinson, Administrative Justice, supra note 9 at 14.
58 Landis, The Administrative Process, supra note 13 at 14.
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objectives that lay behind the movement for securities legislation. The primary
emphasis of administrative activity had to center upon the guidance and
supervision of the industry as a whole. [A]dministrative power, though it may
begin as an effort to adapt and make efficient police protection within a
particular field, moves soon to think in terms of the well-being of an industry
[and thus to] supervision over the economic integrity of industries and their
normal development. [The agencies'] tasks are regulatory but regulatory in a
broad sense, for to them is committed the initial shaping and enforcement of
industrial policies.59
Given these functions, government agencies are more like corporate
managers thanjudges. 'If in private life we were to organize a unit for the
operation of industry, it would scarcely follow Montesquieu's lines The
direction of any large corporation presents difficulties comparable in
character to those faced by an administrative commission. [W]hen
government concerns itself with the stability of an industry it is only
intelligent realism for it to follow the industrial rather than the political
analogue.' 
60
Landis praises an administrator who 'I believe never read, at least
more than causally, the statutes that he translated into reality. He
assumed they gave him power to deal with the broad problems of an
industry, and upon that understanding, he sought his own solutions. '61
This account of administration would seem to be the nightmare of
Hewart, Pound, & Co. made flesh.62 But Landis argues that the manage-
rial theory of administration, given effect, among other ways, by the
combination of investigating, prosecuting, and adjudicating functions, is
subject to important checks - in addition to limited delegation of
authority from the legislature andjudicial review. Its process moves 'in a
narrow field' - and, indeed, the more specialized the agency's mandate,
the better. Its 'singleness of concern quickly develops a professionalism
of spirit.' (This is particularly true, Landis believed, of the 'independent'
commissions set up outside regular executive departments.) Its discretion
rapidly becomes structured by rules and regularities: 'Precedents and
habits as to the disposition of claims quickly tend to make its discretion,
such as it is, the "equitable discretion" of a Court of Chancery.' The
59 Ibid. at 15-6.
60 Ibid. at 10-2.
61 Ibid. at 75.
62 Even Dickinson, who, as we have seen, was relatively sympathetic to administrative
authority, thought Landis was going too far: 'Congress would doubtless be greatly
surprised if it were to learn that by regulatory statutes, whose enforcement is entrusted
to a commission, it has surreptitiously nationalized some of the leading industries of the
country by vesting their actual management in a government agency.'John Dickinson,
'Judicial Characteristics of Administrative Regulation' (1948) 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. 239 at 243.
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agency usually wants to get the policy 'right' for the industry it regulates;
this too constrains its discretion. But the main checks (as Willis, of
course, also argued) are political: 'Placing responsibility directly upon a
specific group means that a finger can be publicly pointed at a particular
man or men who are charged with the solution of a particular ques-
tion.'64
VIII Some observations looking back
The usual critique of the realist apologists for administration is that they
were naive and arrogant technocrats. They believed that immersion in
the 'facts' of a social situation or problem would point the way to its
correct solution. They posited efficiency, or a utilitarian pragmatism
divorced from any ethical or moral foundation, as a unique and sufficient
norm. Thus they sought to locate decision-making authority in an elite of
civil-service boffins who had the command of facts and practical intelli-
gence to know what to do and the competence to carry it out. They were
contemptuous of, or at best indifferent to, both the rule of law and its
value as protection of the vulnerable from arbitrary government act, and
democratic accountability; yet at the same time naive about how easily
their corps of elite administrators could be captured by and turned to the
ends of political and economic power holders. David Dyzenhaus, in his
contribution,6 5 has made a strong case that at least some of these stric-
tures apply to John Willis. I will leave the defence of Willis to colleagues
more competent to make it, and ask how far the critique applies to his
American counterparts.
The charge of naive instrumentalism seems to fit Arnold and Landis
pretty well, as of course it does a host of Progressive intellectuals and
policy makers. A persistently irritating feature of Arnold's writing is the
blithe assumption that, once the formalist scales of illusion have been
scraped from their eyes, smart sensible fellows immersed in the technical
facts of policy problems will briskly arrive at the appropriate practical
solutions. Over and over Arnold identifies particular solutions to hard
problems - like deterring and punishing criminal conduct - as obviously
correct and desirable if one only faces the problems with a mind unclut-
tered by mythic illusions and ideologies. (Arnold did not, however, put
much faith in either the objectivity or the immediate practical payoff of
social science; he had done too much of it himself.) We have seen in
Landis's defence of administration a similar confidence in disinterested
63 Landis, The Administrative Process, supra note 13 at 98-100.
64 Ibid. at 28.
65 David Dyzenhaus, 'The Logic of the Rule of Law: Lessons from Willis' (2005) 55
U.T.L.J. 691.
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specialized expertise. Frank, who had devoted his intellectual efforts to
debunking the illusion of determinacy and objectivity in the 'facts' found
by courts, was fully aware that administrative fact-finding was just as much
a value-laden dispute-riddled enterprise. He simply thought that special-
ists not in the pay of industry, informed by research and experience,
could probably do a better job of finding facts and proposing solutions
than generalist and ideologically hostile courts, adversary advocates, and
lay juries. Policy making based on objective truth might be impossible,
but comparatively superior inquiry was achievable.66
In all these writers there is some uncertainty about where the norms
and aims of the administrative enterprise are to come from. For Landis
they come from general legislative directives identifying a problem and
asking the agency to solve it. Arnold seems more disposed to have the
administrator identify norms from his own practical analysis of the
efficient consequences of policy; in practice, as head of anti-trust enforce-
ment, this led him to dispose of some traditional aims of policy such as
controlling bigness and protecting small business in favour of 'efficiency,'
defined solely as benefits to the consumer. His entire declared normative
agenda is set by the 'standard that it is a good thing to produce and
distribute as much goods as the inventive and organizing genius of man
makes possible.' 67 (This is, of course, a norm, if a rather pinched one.)
Frank always saw himself as a lawyer acting for a client, though, to be
sure, a rather vague client such as 'the President's program' and 'the
purposes of the statute' as rather liberally interpreted by the administra-
tor; but also in the service of what he believed were the New Deal govern-
ment's general norms of preserving the market system by enforcing its
preconditions (adequate disclosure of company information to the
financial markets), taming its worst excesses, and limiting its harmful
externalities.
Were they hostile to the ideal of the rule of law - and, in particular, to
its protections of the vulnerable? On this count I think they must mostly
be acquitted. The leading administrative realists - Frankfurter, Arnold,
Landis, Hale, Frank, Douglas, and Dickinson, among others - were also
civil libertarians. They fully appreciated the benefits of legal processes to
protect the vulnerable. But, unlike the American Bar Association and
other critics of administration, they were unwilling to equate the judicial
process and its norms as they then existed with the rule of law. As we have
seen, they complained that criminal defendants got virtually no process
66 Frank, If Men Were Angels, supra note 12 at 136-7.
67 Thurman W. Arnold, The Folklore of Capitalism (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1937) at 177. I say 'declared' because one cannot read Arnold's work without
perceiving his strong attachment to humanitarian commitments, albeit rationalized in
the hardboiled language of efficiency.
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at all. Administrative decisions affecting vulnerable individuals such as
immigrants were rarely reviewed or reversed by courts. As Frank and
Arnold repeatedly point out, ordinary people - especially people seeking
redress or relief from arbitrary and tyrannical acts of corporations - got
very little protection from courts, since they could neither contract for
fair treatment nor afford access to litigation; and even if they got to a
court, it was likely to be hostile to their claims. Sometimes their best hope
was an administrative process that undertook guardianship of their
interests.
In other words, most of the US realists actually accepted many of what
Willis called lawyers' values; they just denied that these were consistently
or reliably followed by judges, corporate lawyers, and their clients or
adequately protected through common law procedures, laissez-faire
constitutionalism, and ham-handed and hostile review of regulatory
action. Dickinson, the jurist most sympathetic to judicial review of
administrative decisions, thought current judges trained in formalist
habits performed it very ineptly; his book ends with an entire chapter
outlining how a new corps of lawyers and judges would have to be
educated to do the job properly. (They must be educated to see law as
dynamic and evolving, serving broad social and ethical purposes, requir-
ing application to rapidly changing environments that can be appreci-
ated only by study of history and social and economic facts. 68)
What about the charge of indifference to democratic processes and
values? Again, this best fits Arnold - ironically, the only realist with actual
experience of electoral politics, as a member of the Wyoming state
assembly and later mayor of Laramie. Arnold's view of the demos in his
principal writings was of a superstitious herd that could, and should, be
managed by the manipulation of symbols while an elite of private and
public managers attended to the utilitarian agenda of maximizing
welfare. At times this led him towards an admiration of extremely anti-
democratic and even fascist administration, if it proved itself 'efficient,'
69
though he was a strong critic of the persecutions of fascist and commu-
nist regimes, usually for the typically hardboiled reason that they were
inefficient. As administrator of the anti-trust division, he was extraordi-
narily effective in using the resources of the office to bring a record
number of prosecutions but ultimately hampered by the fact that his
technocratic or functional view of anti-trust had, as Alan Brinkley has put
68 Dickinson, Administrative Justice, supra note 9 at 333-58.
69 This critique was levelled against the realists generally, and Arnold specifically, in their
own time. It was revived in a fine article by Douglas Ayer, 'In Quest of Efficiency: The
Ideological Journey of Thurman Arnold in the Interwar Period' (1971) 23 Stan.L.Rev.
1029, and is developed at length in an excellent recent comprehensive treatment of
Arnold's ideas: Mark Fenster, 'The Symbols of Governance: Thurman Arnold, Post-
Realist Legal Theory, and Social Criticism' (2003) 51 Buffalo L.Rev. 1053.
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it, 'no symbolic foundation and no real constituency beyond the small
cadre of lawyers and experts he recruited to the field of antitrust law.'
70
Most New Deal realists, however, thought they had amply sufficient
democratic mandate in Roosevelt's popularity and Congressional majori-
ties. As the realists saw it, powerful institutions and their lawyers were
using rule of law rhetoric - out of professional or class parochialism or
outright bad faith - in order to delegitimate attempts to tackle society-
wide problems through bureaucratic government and to develop doc-
trines to effectively hamstring executive action. In short, they were using
rule of law values to sabotage urgently needed and democratically
approved efforts to recover from the Great Depression and to place
controls on capitalism that would enable it to function in the public
interest. The realist counter-effort was to try to build up the authority,
prestige, and legitimacy of an alternative model of professional action in
the public service, exemplified by lawyers and economists such as them-
selves.
71
This could not be a purely antiseptic, apolitical model of governance:
there was no way to separate 'administration' from 'politics,' given broad
delegations of discretion to administrators to set policies. Landis, Frank,
and Arnold, among others, understood that agency heads would have to
help build broad political support for their policies in Congress and
among outside interest groups, cultivate political friends and alliances,
and publicize the agency's accomplishments.
72
Given the realists' commitment to thickly contextual description of
institutional functioning, it is, to say the least, a curiosity of the realist
literature on administration that it has so little to say about political
influences on the administrative process. Obviously they were aware of
the problem of 'capture,' as it came to be called, or anyway of ad hoc
70 Alan Brinkley, 'The Antimonopoly Idea and the Liberal State: The Case of Thurman
Arnold' (1993) 80J.Am.Hist. 557 at 579. I am not entirely persuaded that this is true.
Arnold spent a good deal of his abundant time and energy going around the country
giving speeches to business and consumer groups and radio audiences and writing
articles for popular periodicals trying to advocate and popularize the goals of his anti-
trust policy. He did, however, blow much of his political capital by bringing a major anti-
trust prosecution against a union - admirably even-handed, but so offensive to an
important pillar of the New Deal constituency that both President Roosevelt and the
new Supreme Court majority slapped him down for it. As Brinkley points out, the major
reason for the collapse of his program was that anti-trust policy gave way to the
corporatist alliances that were forged to win business cooperation in the war effort.
71 There was an interesting internecine controversy over whether these should be
permanent career civil servants who were coming up the ranks or bright-plumed birds
of passage, brilliant lawyers and economists on leave from academia or private practice.
The realists generally favoured exemptions from civil-service requirements that would
permit hiring the latter for important New Deal jobs.
72 See, e.g., Landis, The Administrative Process, supra note 13 at 62.
HeinOnline -- 55 U. Toronto L.J. 424 2005
THE LEGAL REALISTS' DEFENCE OF ADMINISTRATION 425
attempts of special interests to intervene into administrative decisions,
since, as agency heads, they had to deal with it all the time. Political
scientists had extensively described and analysed the phenomenon.73
Landis refers to several such instances in his book. 4 The main concern
for defenders of administration was to try to insulate agencies from such
ad hoc pressures. Landis, for one, believed that part of the solution was to
locate agencies outside executive departments; in 1938 (though he was
later dramatically to revise this view) he believed that 'independence
seems to be the rule of political growth for economic power.' 75 The
realists assumed that 'politics' in the sense of special-interest-group
pressure on agencies was an obstruction to 'democracy,' understood as
the mandate to solve problems in the public interest. It is a fair critique
of them that, in the service of the project to defend administration and
to promote its independence, they tended to romanticize the process in
the same ways, though hardly to the same extent, as conservative lawyers
romanticized courts and the judicial process.76
73 See, e.g., E. Pendleton Herring, Public Administration and the Public Interest (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1936), especially c. 13 ('Shielding Regulatory Commissions from
Politics').
74 See, e.g., Landis, The Administrative Process, supra note 13 at 61-2, 111-2.
75 Ibid. at 112-3.
76 Of all the realists, Walton Hamilton seems to have been most alert to problems of
capture, articulating them as early as 1940. See, e.g., Walton Hamilton & Irene Till,
'Antitrust: The Reach after New Weapons' (1940) 26 Wash.U.L.Q. 1. This made him
leery of the independent-commission model of administration; he leaned rather
towards syndicalist or corporatist sorts of arrangements, such as governance by
representatives of business, labour, and consumers. I am indebted for this insight to
work in progress of Professor Malcolm Rutherford of the University ofVictoria, 'Walton
H. Hamilton and the Public Control of Business' (10 May 2004) [unpublished].
HeinOnline -- 55 U. Toronto L.J. 425 2005
(9
HeinOnline -- 55 U. Toronto L.J. 426 2005
